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CHAPTER I.
EARLY COMMON LAW RULE.
Section 1. In England.
2. In Scotland and Ireland.
3. In America.
Section 1. EGommon Law Rule in England. - The doctrine of
Respondeat Superior, the most important and best knovm maxim of
the law, has one important exception known as the fellow servant
doctrine; which holds that an employer being without fault himself,
cannot be made responsible for the negligent act of one servant
causing damage to a co-servant. This principle was decided by the
courts for the first time in 1837, in the celebrated case of
Priestly vs. Fowler, 3 M. & W., 1. In this case a servant sued for
damages for an inj)Xry caused by the breaking down of a negligent-
ly overloaded van. It is easily seen that this is really not a
case of"fellow servant"at all,but it is said that it has changed
the current of decision and settled it in a new line in a more
radical and determined manner than any case ever decided. In 1850
2.
the doctrine was again laid down and finally established. After
this the master was not liable to any servant for an injury arising
from the fault of a fellow servant, whether such fellow servant be
in a position of authority or not. The construction of the term
fellow servant is given the widest possible range (Report of
House of Commons, committee on employers liability, Parliamentary
papers, 1887. 285).
There are three notable exceptions to this rule in which cases
the master will be liable:
1. - Omission to provide suitable materials and facilities
for the work.
2. - Engaging incompetent workmen through whose fault
the damage occurs.
3. - His (Master's) personal negligence.
Section 2. - In Scotland and Ireland. - The two first cases
in Scotland were decided against this principle, and still held
to the doctrine of "Respondeat Superior". These two decisions
were overruled by the House of Lords on appeal, and though the
Scotch have tried to be independent in the matter their efforts
have not been successful and t'e decision of the House of Lords is
now the recognized rule in Scottish courts. The Irish courts
have followed the rule of Priestly vs. Fowler from the first and
3.
still hold it to be the law.
Section 3.- In America. - The first American case on this topic
is Murray vs. S. C. R. R. Co., 1 McM., 385. It seems a horse was
running obliquely toward the track. The engineer thought the best
and quickest way to get rid of the difficulty was to reach the
point the horse was approaching before the horse would be able to
arrive there; for this purpose he allowed the engine full headway,
but the point was reached simultaneously and the result was that
the animal i n the flesh derailed his iron brother. The plaintiff,
a fireman on the engine, sues for his injury. He obtained a verdib
dict on the lower court of $1500 but the court of errors, assuming
that the engine was, as found, negligent, nevertheless held the
company not liable; the ground of the decision being that the
plaintiff knew that he was to work in concert with others to
produce a single result, namely the running of the train. He
knew the risks and assumed them, this much was admitted by the
nine judges. The final point then is, does the company guarantee
the plaintiff against the negligence of his co-workers? It was
held it does not so guarantee by six judges, three dissenting.
The court states that this is the first case to be decided on this
point, that there must have been many similar accidents previously"
but as no question has been raised, it seems that every one took
it for granted that the master was not liable. It t stated by
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those Anglo-maniacs who cannot gorgive fate for decreeing that
they should be born in Plebian America instead of Aristocratic
England, that all of our good old law as well as our new theories
come from England. Such statements are repudiated, at least in
this one instance. In 1841 the case of Murray vs. S. C. Ry. Co.,
although arising four years after Priestly vs. Fowler,was argued
and decided altogether independently of it, as it was cited by
neither counsel or court; and further Priestly vs. Fowler was not
in reality a true co-employee case but a case where the master
failed to provide a safe van. The first true co-employee case
in England was in 1850, so that the American courts had preceded
the English by nine yeqrs.
The relation of master and servant exists, according to
123 U. S., 523, wherever the employer retains the right to direct
themanner in which the business shall be done, as well as the result
to be accomplished, or in other words, not only what shall be done
but how it shall be done. This case holds that a master is
liable to third persons injured by the negligent act of his servant
in the course of his employment, although the master did not
authorize or know of the servant's negligent act, or even if he
disapproved or forbade it. This rule cannot rest on agency, as
"Qui facit per alium facit per se" is incompatable with the idea
@of anything against the wish of the principle. As this rule
makes a master liable when he did not authorize or approve but
even forbade the act, it is based. neither on justicemor equity,
but has its foundation in public policy and social utility.
When one for his own benefit puts inaction a mechanism either
inianimate or human or both and through some flaw it injures a third
person, the master should be liable to him. If a passenger is
injured, clearly the master is liable for the carrying of him
was for the master's benefit; but I think it was also for the
passenger's benefit, otherwise hewould not have paid for the privi-
lege of being carried. The employees position is the same as
the passenger's as to the benefits derived, the difference being
the greater benefit to the servant than to the passenger. Thus
far thdir positions ate similar but Chere remains one vital
distinction. The passenger depends for his safety entirely on
the provisions made by the master for his safe carriage, ard cannot
avoid the result of any negligence, being unable to see it; but
the servant, as ont of the employees, can see the acts of his co-
workers and be cautious accordingly; he may also admonish them
to be more careful, and if they are hot he may leave the. employment.
The leading case on this point is known as Farwell's Case 4 Met.
49, decided in 1842. An engineer was injured by the negligence of
a switchman, a careful and trustworthy man, who left a switch open.
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It was held that the engineer could not recover, being a fellow
servant. It was stated by Chief J. Shaw, that the fountain head, ,
prolific of just decisions which seem to grow stronger as the world
grows older and wiser, that the implied contract of the master
does not extend to indemhify the servant against the negligence
of any one but himself. The eminent judge held it to be best for
the traveling public that those who are component parts of that
wonderful combination, the modern railroad, should be as careful
as possible. Such care would be more likely to be used by the
employees if each depended for his safety on the care of the others,
thus making them overseers of eachother's acts. The required
care could net be obtained if large damages were allowed for
injuries to each other, it is self evident that such a state of
affairs would tend to make the employees careless. This case has
never been overruled in England and but by one state (Tenn.) in
America. The English Employers Liability Act recognizes it and
only enacts exceptions to the doctrine there laid down. That the
rule in Farwells case is oftentimes very severe and seemingly
unjust is obvious, especially vhere the plaintiff is in a wholly
different department from the one whose negligence caused the
injury. This is recognized in 25 Fed. Rep.,837, decided in 1886.
A fireman was killed by the negligence of the engineer of another
train. The judge held them fellow servants, following Farwellrs
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case; but stated that though the principle in Farwells case may
not be unquestionably correct, still fifty years of nniversal
application, coupled with the eminent authority declaring it, rakes
the rule binding on the judiciary. arn. a'ny change , if necessary,
must come from the legislature.
CHAPTER II.
PRESENT ENGLISH LAW.
EMPLOYERS LIABILITY ACT 1880 (42 & 43 Vict.).
The rule in England was that the master was never liable for
the negligence of a fit and competent servant, whatever his grade
might be. This manifest hardship on the servants led to the
Employers liability Act of 1880. The necessity of syach an act
in America is not as keenly felt, as the rule of a master's
liability is samewhat different in the two countries. In America
he cannot delegate his authority and with it his liability. As
the English Employers Liability Act (43 & 44 Vict.) is the founda-
tion of all later legislation on the subject, and has to a(-certain
extent influenced judicial tribunalsfit may not be amis to state
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the principle faatures of the "Act" and show how they are construed.
It states that the master my not raise the special defense of
co-employment, but that t he action will lie as if the injured
party was not a servant of the defendant, where the injury was
due to any:
1. Defect in the condition of the,-
(a) Ways.
(b) Works.
(c) Machinery.
(d) Plant connected with or used in the business of the
defendant.
2. Negligence of a superintendent while acting as such.
3. Negligence of one whose direction inust be followed.
4. AAct or omission of one following,-
(a) A rule or by-law of employer.
(b) Instructions of another having delegated authority.
5. Negligence of employee having charge or control of any,-
(a) Signal.
(b) Points.
(c) Locomotive.
(d) Train.
The Employers Liability Bill of 1888 ammended the "Act of
1880" by inserting "or arrangement" after"Conditinn" in 1; and
"buildings or premises" after plant in 1 (d).
The defect must havearisen from, or not been discovered or
remedied, owing to the neglect of the employer or som one entrusted
by him to see that the "Ways , works etc. " were in proper
condit ion.
Construction of the Act.
The provision of the "Act", "as if he had not been a workman"
is construed to mean, as if he had been one of the public, who is
on the master's prdmises qthis invitation on business. The first
provision which gives the workman a right of action is a "Defect
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in the conditionA way". The leading case on this point is fbund.
in 10QB. Div. 5. A workman was employed to take by means of a
two wheeled car, uwhite hot" balls of iron to a steam hammer.
While the deaeased was running rapidly, drawing the car after him,
it struck a piece of fire brick which was placed negligently on
the "way", the car stopped, the deceased fell and the ball through
its momentum, rolling forward/fell on to him causing severe
injuries from which he died. His executors brought an action
under the lAct", but the cart held, that the defect was not in
the "way*, nor in the"condition of the way", but in a negligently
placed obstruction. One of the judges drew the !'ollowing analogies.
If a drunken man staggered along the road would that be a defect
in the road? And if he were lying down dead drunk would that be
any more of a defect? A broken board in the floor of a dark
passage would be a defect in the way, but a pail left there would
be an obstruction.
In Scotland in 23 Scottish L. R., 108, the rule seems otherwis
wise. The plaimtiff, a bi'aken-an on defendants train, by order of
the engineer, stepped down onto the foot-board of the engine. As
he did. so a bar of iron projecting from a pile of pig iron at the
side of the track, struck his foot and injured him severly. The
court held that as the iron was piled negligently close to the
track it created a defect in it and the master would be liable for
11.
damages accruing by an injury therefrvm. This case has been
criticised and is not considered a very strong authority.
In Pegram vs. Dixon, 55 L. J. Q.B. 447., the plaintiff, a
workman, was ascending a ladder through an elevator "well" in a
new building, when a board was throvm down without warning,
breaking his collar bone. This "way" had been previously used to
throw down rubbish. Held, no defect in the way but mrely a
negligent act of a fellow servant. Thus it may be seen that the
Judiciary holds to a very strict construction of t1B tenn way as
set forth by the oegislative branch.
The line of demarkation seems to be that whe- the employer
has used due care and provided a safe way, the fact that some fel
low servant renders it dangerous does not mate the master liable
It seems to me an interesting question might arise, as to when a
simple obstruction remaining undisturbed would becone a defect.
It also seems to me that a brick removed from the "way" would be
no more of a defect than an extra brick placed on thewXay; still
the former is declared a defect qnd the latter not. The cause of
its absence or presence, the cire mtance and effect of the accident
may all be the same, and if one is a defect so also should be the
other.
Next in order is the defect in the"Works". The leading case
is found in 17 Q. B. Div., 189. The plaintiff was injured by the
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falling d7 a wall which was to be the side of a house when cmplet-
ed. The rule was laid down, that as the term "ways" means ways
used in the business and not partly made ways not used, therefore
the term"works'must have the same construction. To be used in the
business, the "work s" of course must be completed. Obviously
if the employer is a builder a different rule would apply (building
is held to include~taking down of houses).
The rule as to defect in "machinery" is found in 16 Q. B. Div.,
52. A machine is defective if not in a proper condition to perform
the work or purpose for which it is used. A better case on this
point is in 22 Scottish L. R. 698. An alarm of fire in a factory
was given. The plai ntiff in shutting the fire proof door smashed
his fingers, and sued the owner for his injury. The defense set
up was that the plaintiff would not have been injured had: he shut
the door carefully. The coLrt held, that although the door had
been, and could be shut without injury if done carefully, still
the door was made to be used "in case af.fire" and should be suit-
able for that purpose. In such a case men must act in a hurried_
manner .
Plant includes all -paratus used by a business man fr carry-
ing on his business (not his stock in trade); all chattels, fixed
or mavable, alive or dead, which he keeps for permanent employment
in his business, (19 Q. B. Div., 658). The injury complained of
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must have been caused "by the defect" in the natural and ordinary
sequence of events. (33 W. R. 216).
Subsection 2 of section I gives the injured employee an action
where the negligence is of a Superintendent in the exercise of
his authority as such. The leading case on" Superintendence" is
in l 4B. D. 585. One B was foreman of a gang of men loaCing a
ship. He stood by the hatchway and warned the men below when
t1-e bales were to descend; by failing to give such warning a bale
fell on the plaintiff, who sues therefore. Held, (by Shultz J.)
that B was not entrusted solely or principally with superintendence,
but was a co-laborer working with his hands all day. This settled
the case as to subsection 2 of section I. It was fuither agreed
that subsection 3 of section I applied; "by negligence of one
whose orders must be obeyed". Hawkins and Smith J.J., state as
follows "conceding that these orders must have been obeyed", still
they fail to see where B gave an order - "thereforejif he never
gave an order/ the plaintiff could not have bound to his injury by
it". It seems to me that this is rather a falacious reasoning.
If B had said move to the right, and the plaintiff was injured,
clearly the master would have been liable; if he B)says nothing
at all it is equivalent to ordering the plaintiff to stand where
he was. The duty was placed on B to tell the men below where to
stand and a failure to tell thbm was a much greater fault than a
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wrong order; the latter would be merely an error of judgement
while the former is negligence pure and simple. It is strange
indeed when a court will excuse the negligence the statute aims
at and punish as negligent a wrong order. The negligent act
complained of must have been one of superintendende. In the case
in 10 Q,. B. Div., 356, the plaintiff was injured by the negligent
failure of his superintendent to check the movement of a crane by
a guy rope, of which the superintendent had charge. The court
held that a.though the man in charge of the guy rope had superin-
teziding powers, still as the act which caused the injury was done
in his capacity as a fellow workma the-master would not
be liable. In Scotland no distinction is drawn between the
negligence of a superintendent an. negligent superintendence.
24 Sc. L. R. 91. Subsection 3 of section I gives the injured
employee an action when he was injured by following the negligent
order of one who must be obeyed. It is immaterial what position
in the employment the one giving the order holds; the only question
being did he have the power to give such an order? (3 Times L.R.
779) ( 12 R ISc.) 804) Subsection 4 of section I, allows the
injured party to recover where the injury is caused by an act
done in carpliance with the rules or by-laws of the employer.
Both parties are held to comtemplate the effect of such rules
except where, -
1. Employee has not equal means of knowledge.(3 Macqueen
266.)
2. Danger is immeasurably increased by absence of due
care ( 27 L. J. Ex. 325).
Subsection 5 of sectionI, requires that the negligence rpust be
of one who has charge or control of any signal, points, locomotive
or train; and not merely of one who cares for or works about
them. It was stated in 11 Q. B. D., at p. 22 , that the negligenc.e
of one who cleaned, oiled and inspected point boxes, was not the
negligence of one who had charge or control of them. Such an
oiler has no more charge or control of the points, than a workman
who"taps"wheels , to discover if they have the true ring which
precludes a flaw, has charge or control of them.
Section II, has a clause preventing recovery if the plaintiff
knew of the defect. This rule is general and is taken in connec-
tion with all the "Act". He has a ieasonable time to communicate
notice of the defect, unless the employer or sane superintendent
knows of it already. Knowledge of the danger will not bar a
recovery if the master fails in some statutory duty thereto.
(As fencing a dangerous fly-Wheel, per BramwellB. in L. R.
7 Ex. 130.)
The damages under the "Act" would be the estimated earnings
during the three years preceeding the injury, of a person in the
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same gradeemployment and district. This was not a measure of
danages but merely a limit, and if the person made over time,
such could also be allowed ( 53 L. T., 999).
The "Act" was meant only to make the employer liable in
certain caees, provided nothing was proven to the contrary
between the partiesi therefore a contract to waive the "Act" was
held valid (9 Q. B. Div., 357). As the "Act" applied to but a lim
ited number of cases, construed strictly; and as nearly every con
contract of employment contained a "waiving clause", ( due to
the fact that warkmen were plentiful and positions scarce) the
benefits were not as far reaching as might be expected from the
terms of the acts.
CHAPTER III.
AMERICAN STATUTES
FOLLOWING THE ENGLISH ACT.
The american statutes on this subject although fo-inded on,
and to a great extent copies of the English "Act", vary in the
different states. Those atates which have virtually reenacted
the English Act, construe it in substantially the same manner.
Most of #:i t have practically reenacted it. The study of it
is of more importance than the act of any American state except
the one in which the question at issue arrises. When a conflict
arises as to jurisdiction, the rule in (5 Fed. R. at page 75) will
apply, which allows a state statute to be enforced in a national
court when the citizenship of the parties, or the nature of the
subject, will permit.
The dependent condition of the employee as related to his
employer, clearly gives power to the latter to coerce the former
into contracts waiving the benefits of the "Act". This being so
i the American states exceptGeorgia forbid such contracts.
Carriers may not contract away their liability for negligence in
the carriage of chattels. To allow them to contract away their
liability for the safetv of ho se in their employ, would be the
placing of the value of a man's life and limb below the interest
they might have in the chattel. Such waiving contracts are
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forbidden in,-
Alabama - 91 Ala. 514., 92 Ala. 218.
Massachusetts - Public statutes Chapter 74 Art. III.
Indiana - Act of 1893 Chapter 130 Art. V.
Iowa - Code 1880 Art. 1307.
But not in Georgiar 50 Ceo. 46F , 89 Geo. 318.
The Massachusetts statute is based. on the English Act. It
provides that a workman in the exercise of due care and diligence
may recover if injured by reason of any defect in the condit ion of
the Ways Works or Machinery connected with or used in the business
of the enployer; which arose fromor had not been discovered or
remedied/ owing to the negligence of t-'e employer or of some one
entrusted with the care of them.
Section II, provides for a recovery where the negligence is
of one entrusted. with an4exercising superintendence.
SectionIII, gives a right of action where the negligence is
of one having charge or c ontrol of any signal, switch, locomotive
or train.
Section IV, If an employer enters into a contract with ano
ther to have his work performed by the other, he will be liable
for injuries to the employees of such a contractor due to any
defect inthe"ways, wcrks"etc.
To constitute "ways or works", the appliances must be of a
19.
pernanent or quassi permanent character. Thus a temporary staging
put up by masons is no part of the "ways or works" (160 Mass. 457).
The American courts Kave followed the English constructioi, that
the"vrays or works" must be finished before a defect can be proved
under trn statute; unless the employer is a builder (160 Mass. 248
at page 252). Its held in Massachusetts in (159 Mass. at p 1)
that where a comtractor ordered one of his men to carry a bar of
iron down a rovable staif,which slipped and caused an injury to the
workman, the contractor is not liable. But in 159 Mass. 287, where
the injury was caused by a defective aar of a third party used
by the defendants to transport stone from their quarry, the defend-
ant was held liable. The distinction is thus clearly drawn ,
that if the use is to be 6f a permanent character, if only for a
day or an hour it is within the statute; but if it merely an
incidental user it is not included. To be within the statute
therefore, it seems it must .be a permanent user of a finished
product adapted to produce a given result.
The forwarding of cars, formerly devolved merely the duty of
inspection( 156 Mass. 13) ; but by the ammendatory statute of 1893
Chapter 359, it is enacted that a car in use by or in .the
possession of a raiload company shall be deemed to be part of
its "ways, works and machinery". Interesting cases arise where
the defect is in the railroad of anoth.er company over which the
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defendant's train is passing. Such a case is that in 156 Mass. 298
It was there laid down that it may not be necessary to render the
master liable that ,ie should own the road over which his train
runs, but he must at least have some control over it. It must be
used in his business by his authority, express or implied. The
phrase, "connected with or used. in the business of the employer",
cannot be taken literally, but must be taken in connection with
the terms "ways, works and machinery", and held to mean those used
in his business, by his alxthority and subject to his control,
The term "machine" may be defined as a combination of moving
mechanical parts, adapted to receive motion and apply it to the
production of a mechanical result (Walker on Patant Law). The
term machinery has a somewhat broader scope than machine, the court
in each case must decide whether the facts and circumstances bring
it within the meaning cf the term.
A superintendent is one having the direction of employees acts,
coupled with the power of hiring and dismissing workmen. His sole
or principle duty must be that of superintendence, and the negli-
gence complained of must have been done in the capacity of superin-
tendent while acting as such. (160 Mass. 131, 155 Mass. 584)
In 156 Mass 242,the plaintiff was injured by the negligence of the
engineer of a stationery engine, who was also a superintendent.
The court held, that as the act complained of was done in his
21.
capacity as a workman ard not through his auth orty as a sue1 r inl
tendent, the plaintiff could have no recovery. The law recognizes
thm- dual being;vf the superintendent for some purposesand a common
laborer for others. If the injury is caused by an obvious danger
with which the plaintiff is, or ought to be, familiar, he has no
recovery (150 Mass. 423, 157 Mass. 418).
In cases under the statute the evidence of the negligence is
a very important matter, at times very complex and seemingly
unjust, as for instance where a workman was injured by the caving
of the sides of a ditch due to lack of shoring. Plaintiff attempt-
ed to show that it had been properly shored up immediately after
the accident. The court stated that such evidence must beexcluded,
as a subsequent use of a particular safeguard. is no more evidence
of prior negligence, than a subsequent lack of caution would be
evidence of former care and diligence. This looks remarkably
like reasoning backwards but the above is unquestionably the old
and well established rule.
When a person sues for injuries by a train, the negligence
must have been of one having charge or control of the train, but
it my have been only a temporary charge (156 Mass. 262). Upon
a railroad means upon the road proper and moving or prepared to
move (156 Mass. 13 at pape 18, 164 Mass., 296 at page 301).
The train itself may be one ormore cars with ar without a locomotive
22.
(159 Mass. 348). Formerly a locomotive was required to be attached
to bring it within themeaning of the term. (153 Mass. 112).
The Alabama statute is a virtual copy of the Massachusetts
act and is construed in substantially the same manner. Very often
cases arise where the plaintiff is a non-resident. The question
then resolves itself into whether the statute is a part of the
contract of employment. The contract of employment merely creates
the relation of master and. servant, the statute tien acts on
the incidents of such a velation. Therefore the liability under
the statute does not arise from the contract of employment, but
is an obligation based on a given set of circumstances within the
state (97 Ala., 126).
Ah employee having notice Gf a defect cannot recover for an
injury therefrom unless such defec t was known to the master and he
had time to remedy it (11 S. R. 733). Until such notice the
eniployee may pre sume there are no defects (17 S. R. 452). The
plaintiffin his complaint, when alleging a defect, must also allege
that it was not discovered or remedied owing to the negligence
of the master, or some one by him authorized to care for it (85
Ala., 272). When he enters the employment the employee of course
accepts all patent defects; it follows naturally that if he dis-
covers a defect, in the course of his employmaat, he assumes it
also,unless he gives notice, in which case he may wait a reasonable
time for its correction (97 Ala., 359).
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In the case reported in 17 S. R., at page 30 an engineer ran
his engine with great force against a stop block, placed on the end
of a trestle, tearing it up and toppling over. The fact that the
stop block was very defective did not give the plaintiff a right
of action, because no matter how good the stop block might have
been madq,,it co-ld not have withstood the shock. The defect
in the 'ways etc." must be an inherent part of them. In 97 Ala.,
at page 240 the plaintiff a switchman was about to alight from
a moving train, to do which it wa. necessary to swing out from
th. side of the train before dropping to the ground. As the
plaintiff swung out he struck a car which was placed on a
switch within a foot of the min track. The courtstated, that as
the Alabama "Act" was a copy of the English "Act",the decisions of
the English courts handed down shortly after its passale, have
very great influence with the American courts !This influence,
owing to the circumstances, was much greater than is ordinarilly
due the learning and ability of t1ose courts. It seems to me
that if the whole switch was within twelve inches of the main track
it would be a defect in the condition o2 such main track, as soon
as cars were placed on the switch. Some part of any switch must
necessarilty be within twelve inches of the main track, not of
itself a detect, but when cars are placed on that portion which
is within a foot it should be held a defect therein, one car so
24.
placed would have the same unenviable quality of sweeping unsus-
pecting trainmen from the side ladders, as wuuld a whole train.
In either case there would be the same point of cantact, namely th2
the-first car within twelve inches of the main track. A track
being so near a wall that a trainman was injured thereby was held
a defect in the "ways" (14 S. R., 175). I think a car is as
dangerous as a wall if placed too near the track.
If an employee is injured by a defect, while he is breaking
a rule, in using such defective contricance, he cannot recover
(12 S. R. 273 - 294 - 714). A railroad company under the statute,
4s at commn law, is bound to provide safe ard. reasonable mahhinery
but is not obliged to have the "newest thing out", thought it may
be a safer appliance. But I think the two appliances mAght be
cempared before the jury to show if reasonable care had been used
in providing safe machinery.
Superintendence is the power possessed by one over the men and
appliances used in the work. It need not hate been over the
injured person, but if the negligence injures any servant the mastEr
is liable (97 Ala., 245), unless the plaintiff is guilty of
contributoty negligence. This latter can only be excused by
wanton, careless or intentional negligence on defendant's part.,
One having control of a stationary engine need not necessarily be
25.
a superintendent, but is usually a fellow servant ; because he
receives not gives orders. (14 S. R. 10). The foreman of a section
gang is held to be a superintendent in 13 S. R. 308. The section
of the "Act" relating to those having charge or control, excludes
any-one having control in breach of a rule or regulation of the
company (14 S. R. 209). A section foreman in charge of a hand.
r_ c 0-of
car comes within the rule,(ll S. R. 262).
The injury complained of must havebenn received while under-
taking the particular service called for in 1his contract of employ-
ment, or while obeying the orders of a superior. If he is iijured
while engaged in some service by way of accoldation he cannot
recover (85 Ala 203). The burden of pzmving negligence under the
statute lies on the plaintiff (84 Ala. 133).
The early law of Georgia provided that when one engages
to serve a rpaster, he undertakes to run the isk of his employment,
including that arising fron the negligence of fellow servants
(15 Geo., 534). This rule did not apply to hired slaves.;
first, because they were chattels,
second, because they had no choice butto obey orders
(1 Ga. 195).
In 1855 the following "Act" was passed in Georgia (Code , section
3036). If the person injured is himself an employee, the damage
being caused by another employee; and if the plaintiff was without
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fault he may recover. This was held not to apply to the receivers
of a railroad holding possession of it for a court of chancery.
The plaintiff cannot rec.over if he is at fault himself, even
though acting under directions of a superior (55 Ga. 279). The
sam rule holds as to his using a defective contrivance, as such a
user would be a fault (55 Ga. 133). The only excuse for an
employee w ho goes beyond his own sphere and is injured, is
necessity, of the which the jury are to be judges (53 Ga. G630).
Section 3033 of the code provides that recovery can be had
f or,
first, Damage to persons, stock or other property caused
by the runnin', of trains or other machinery.
second, damge done by any person in the service of the
company,unless reasonable care and diligence was used.
Section 3034 provides that no recovery can be had when the injury
was caused by the negligence or with the consent of the pl]aintiff;
if both are negligent then the darages shall be reduced in
proportion to the plaintiff's fault.
Section 3036 (belonging after 3034, where it was in the old code),
enacts that even if an employee is injured he may recover if he be
without fault.
Section 2083 states that as railrpad companies h ave many employees
who cannot possibly control those who should exercise care and
diligence in the running of traiqs, the company should be liable
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to such employees for want of such care and diligence. Under
this last clause the question arises, must the injury be caused
by the "running of trains" alonel If 2083 is taken in connection
with 3033,:then it will be seen that 2083 refers to 3033 anC
includes part II as well as I of that section (ante page 26).
(64 Ga., 509).
Construing the sections to(ether the law seems to be that the
company shall be liable for any injury caused by negligently rune
ing trains in their service or employment, or any other negligence
except,
first, where the plaintiffs negligence alone caused the injuryi
(whether or not he is an employee).
second, if partly at fault/the damagesbe given according to
the degree of fault (not applying to employees).
third, if any fault is shown on the plaintiff's part (he
being an employee).
The fault of the plaintiff, to bar his recovery, must have had.
something to do with the injury. Where an engineer was injured
by the caving in of dirt , the fact that he had a brother engineer
on board, against the rules of the company, is no bar to his
recovery (63 Ga., 181).
Section 3033 of the code,states that the presumption in all cases
is against the company. Iut in 61 Ga. 153 it is held tlhat though
the presumption is against the company every ti e and on every
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issue, after the fact of the killing on the defendant's road if
proven; still when it is shovm either that the plaintiff by his
own negligence caused the injury, or that the comeany was not
negligent, the burden is shifted because either will relieve the
company. In 30 Ga., at page 150 is found what seems to me the
true rule in so called fellow servant cases. The doctrine of fellow
servant is one of public policy to secure better service and safer
transportation for both servants and passengers, by making eachone
look after and encourage the carefullness of the rest. Surely
this reasoning can have no application to employees who have no
I
connect~g-influences over eachother. the rule is in the nature
of a penalty, and to impose a penalty where there is no chaice of
exercising that care it was meant to enforce is sheer cruelty.
If a railway company permits another to run cars over its road,
it is still liable for &ll accidents due to Aegligence, because
the legislature gave the franchise on the credit of the owner's
capital that his privileges could not be abused (49 Ala., 355).
The Florida law need not be discussed at length as it is a
copy of the law of Georgia an. is therefore construed in the same
manner, at least in so far as is not inconsistent with the general
legislation in Florida on the subject (15 S. R. 882). The statute
is found in chapter 3744 section 2346 ( page 764).as follows, a
fellow servant may recover, if injured through the negligence of a
co-worker, provided he is without fault himself.
In Mississipi it is provided that an emploype of a railroad
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company shall have the sane action for injury caused by any act
or omission of the corporation or its employees, as is allowed by
law to others not employees, where the injury results from the neg-
ligence of an employee dngaged in another department of labor
( sec. 193 of Const. of 1890). The only question to arise under
this "Act" will be as to the distinction of departments. It ha,
been held under it that an engineer and telegraph operator are not
in the same department. So also as to a fireman on one train and
the engineer on another train of the same company.
The Missouri law on the subject is in a peculiar position
owing to the abstuusness of the statute itself, and the position
taken by the court in its construction. The statute (R. S. 1889
sec. 4425 ) enacts in substance, that whenever any person shall
die from an injury resulting from or occasioned by the negligence,
unskillfulness or criminal intent of any officer, agent, servant or
enployee in the employ of a trasnportation company, the master
shall b@ liable,; and whenever any passeng.hr shall die from an
injury owing to any defect in the railroad, steamboat or etc., or
from the negligence, carelessness or criminal intent above declared
the master shall be liable.
Section 4426 gives a right of action to the representatives
of the deaeased in a case where he himself could have recovered
if the injuries 7ad not resulted in death.
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In 36 Mo. at p 13 the court held that the statute meant what
the natural import of the wordsseemed to imply; that is if anyone
was killed through the above specified negligence, an action
would lie against the ccmpany. This holding was reversed in
(159Mo., 285Y. In this latter case the judge,,that the decisicn
in the former case was not based on logical grounds. The interpre-
tation thus given allowed the employee rights which he did not
before possess (an action for inj-ries due to the negligence of a
co-servant). It is not natural that the legislature would take
away the enployees clear rigit of action for an injury due
to defective machinery, and give him a new right of action against
common usage and of questionable utility; namely, fbr injury due
to the fault %of a co-servant. There are further objections,
section 4425 so construed, gives the widow $5,000.00 if her
husband is killed outright by the negligence of a fellow servant;
while the following section allows no such action in a case of
injury merely. Thus $5,000.00 would be allowed to a widow if her
husband was killed outright, but no recovery could be had if he
lost his arms or legs, or both. Arecovery at law is given as a
compensation for the loss of the head of a family; such a rule
would allow one damages for being negligently deprived of an
income, but would give him nothingif the inco-le were turned into a
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source of expense. It seems that the eminent judge endeavored
by taking the whole "Act" into consideration, to eliminate the
distinction arising from a liberal construction of the tenn "any
person"as used in the first clause, andto hold it as excluding
fellow servants froc its benefits. The "Act" was passed in 1855.
The court in 1865 held that the term "any person", meant exactly
what it said, ard. thus included fellow servants. This construetion
was not questioned by the courts until 1875, twehty years after
its passage. In the meantime the Legislature knowing the first
construction placed on its "Act" anrnot objecting, proves that
the construction met with its approval. That this interpretation
met with the ppproval of the People, Bar, Court and Legislature
during the ten years following 1865, hould of itself cause
much hesitation before so peremptorially overruling it as to place
the stigma of ignorance upon them. Section 2 an(; 3 can be
distinguished on the ground that while the widav receives $5,000.00
for the negligent of her husband; the successor of the passenger
has'his $5,000.00 against the owner of the negligently defective
contrivance. Section 2 is penal, (shallforfeit or pay) while
3 is compensatory ("shall be liable to an action for damages).
It would seem from the great diffenence between the inherent natun
of section 2 and 3 that they should not be construed together, so
as to eliminate the clear meaning of either or part of either.
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The prime reason for the latter construstion seems to be that it
coincides with the fellowserva-t doctrine of the comnn law,
the theoretical benefit of which is that it tends to make each
servant his "brother's keeper" in a certain sense. If one sees
his coservant is generally negligent and liable to cause him
injury, for which he will have no recovery, he will naturally
report such negligence and have it eliminated. But is this not
likely to make the master careless as to the quality or conduct
of his servants. Let it be granted that the fellow servant
doctrine is salutory. The rule is the same under t} e statute,
except as to death. But there is a distinction which gives good
reasoh for the statutory exception. The fact that ones wife will
receive $5,000.00 for his death will not make him ary the less
careful to preserve his life. In the existing state of marital
relations, it would probably tend to make him more careful, and
not allow the successor of his connubial joys the added benefit
of ki=c statutory recovery. Hard cases are presumed under the
statute, as where recovery is allowed far a man's death but not
for an injury :hichl leaves him a charge on his family. Such cases
may be flagined under any law instituted by the human mind.. To be
absolutely equitable a law must have come from 0mnip~tence itself,
which would be able to forsee all cases. 'The co-mon law, which
has grovm under the fostering care of oLw "great Judges" does
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not at all times cover all cases. How much more unlikely is the
Legislature on its first passage of a single act to arrange it
to cover all cases imaginable. The mere fact that a law does not
apply equitably to all cases is no reason that it is not good law
as to the cases it does cover. The Missouri courts seem to override
a prime rule of onstruction laid dovm by Brett 1. R. in (Gibbs
vs. The Great Western Ry. Co., 12 Q. B. Div., 208 - 211), that if
an "Act" is L-assed for the benefit of workmen it is the duty of the
courts not to construe it strictly as against workmen.
In Iowa (Code Sec. 2002) every corporation is liable for
all damages sustained by aby perwon, including employees of such
corporation, in consequence of the neglect of agents, or by the
mismanagement of the engineer's or other employees of the
corporation, and in consequence of the willful wrongs, 1-hether of
commission o)r omission of such agents, engineers, or other
employees, when :uch wrongs are in any manner co nnected with
the use and operation of any railroad, on or about which they
shall be employed, and no contract which restricts such liability
shall be binding. Unlike the atatute of Georgia, t-e judgment
under the above may be obtained a,-ainst a receiver and satisfied
out of the property of the corporation (62 Iowa, 728).
If the act be within the scdpe of his authority the c mpany is
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liable even though such act be willfully wrongful (64 Iowa 568).
As this statute is in derogation of the common law it is
construed strictly. It is held to cover only those enga-ed in
the running of the railway. It does not cover the case of one
who wipes engines, keeps a turn table free from snow and. operates
it (65 Iowa 417),nor does it include employees in the machine
shops of the company (46 Iowa 399), and car repairers are not,
within its purview (64 Iowa 644).
It seems therefore t at the cotirt holds the statute as meanin7
the hazarduos work of the running of trains rather than the
running of a railway.
In Indiana we find a virtual copy of the English Act,except
that the knowledge of a co-worker's incompetency is held the
same as knowledge of a defect and must be communicated to the
master by the employ e if he knew or ought to have known of such
incompetency. If accidents happen without the state, the
plaintiff being a resident of the state,on a railroad running
through the state the master will be liable. All contracts of
release by the employee, and rules ar regulations of the master
to the same effect are held invalid. (Indiana Statutes 1894, Sec.
7083 - 7087) In both Indiana and. Iowa we find statutes prohibit-
ing the black listin- of discharged employees.
The Colorado statube is a virtual copy of the English Act.
We have seen that originally the master was liable for all
theacts of his servant (Respondeat Superior),. This was found
to be such a hardship on the master that he was released from all
responsibiity for the nggligent acts of his servants as between
eachother (Fellow Servant doctrine) .
When this rule was laid down, it had indoubtedly the godd
and salutory effect of making each co-employee's defenseless
position a check on the carelessness of himself and. his fellows.
But tiie wonderful gvowth of corporations, and the specialization
of labor, separating each one of a group from all contkactk or
inflence of those in another department, have ibade the members
of each group as entirely independent of each ol her as if they wer
under bifferent masters. They really are under different masters,
for obviously the saperintendent of a certain de-ar-ment has no
influence over and. is independentof every other division of the
corporate business. Clearly a servant,in one group, acting as a
component part thereof, can have no effect on or influence over
a member of another; therefore as41 reaso- for the fellow servant
rule has ceased, the rule should follow the reason. Thus it seems
the "different department doctrine" is and. ought to be the correct
solution of the question.

